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EXPORTING SECURIT Y
China, the United States, and the Innovator’s Dilemma
Robert C. Rubel

C

hina’s emergence as an economic and military power has absorbed considerable energy on the part of U.S. policy and strategy makers and pundits. One
of the big questions is whether China will be content as a regional hegemon with
global interests or will seek to displace the United States as the primary global
power. A direct answer to this question is not possible, of course, because even
Chinese leaders may not have settled on an explicit strategy. More likely, they will
react to events as they occur and seek to take advantage of perceived opportunities.
On the other hand, a new perspective on geopolitics might help us develop
insights that could underpin an explicit grand strategy for the United States that
would serve its long-term interests regardless of what Chinese intentions are or
might become. To be clear, this article will not espouse a particular grand strategy; it simply will offer an insight into how Chinese policies might trend, possible
U.S. strategies to counter such policies, and the implications of such strategies.
The insight offered is that China is developing a web of commercial and political relationships with countries with which the United States has conflicts or that
are not a focus of American policy, and that in the long run this might upset the
existing global power structure.1 This is good grist for alarmist and perhaps realist mills, but it is not offered in that spirit. Rather, the issue is as much about the
intrinsic character of the United States as it is about any scheme by China. The
argument required to get to this understanding is a bit intricate, but in the end
the visualization of the problem is pretty straightforward. In the process, we will
need to rearrange the map of the world and to draw in some innovation theory
from the business world.
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EMBRACING THE EDGE: MERCATOR GEOPOLITICS
Anyone who has read Halford Mackinder’s seminal work Democratic Ideals and
Reality has seen his schematic depiction of the world as a group of circles of different sizes that depict the continents in terms of either land area or population.2
Eurasia—or, in Mackinder’s parlance, the World Island—is like the sun, with the
lesser continents and islands its satellites.
There are a couple of interesting subliminal messages embedded in such a depiction. The continents are blobs: self-contained, with smooth exterior surfaces.
North America is pushed off to one side, and Africa does not even make the cut
to be shown. The implications of this made sense in 1942; nations were sovereign
entities, and it was state power that governed their interactions. Moreover, as
would be natural from a British geographer’s perspective, Eurasia lay to the east
and America to the west. The world was composed of smooth-surfaced globules
of sovereign power, with the Eurasian colossus in the middle. By 1992, of course,
whatever the globular nature of Eurasia might have been previously, real or potential, it had burst into a bunch of smaller bubbles.
If we now consult Mercator charts of the world, we see that they tend to be
published in one of three ways: with the Americas in the center and Eurasia split
in half; with the Americas on the left and Eurasia on the right, with the Pacific
Ocean split in half; or, less often, with the Americas on the right and Eurasia
on the left, with the Atlantic split in half. The three depictions reflect both cartographic convenience and cultural bias. None of these depictions contain any
inherent geopolitical meaning. However, there is a fourth way to lay out the map
that does have such meaning. In the spring of 2012, the Naval War College created a massive twenty-four-by-forty-four-foot world map that was used as the basis
for a fleet synchronization conference attended by almost all the U.S. Navy’s top
admirals. On this map were arrayed hundreds of ship models and unit markers
representing where USN forces would be on a particular date in the future. The
most revealing and interesting aspect of the whole thing was not where the ship
models were placed, but how the map was configured. The war-gaming faculty,
as a matter of mechanical convenience, had laid out four constituent strips, of
ninety degrees of longitude each, with North America split in half and Eurasia in
the center. The West Coast of the United States was positioned on the right side
of the map and the East Coast on the left.
The first compelling impression to arise from this arrangement was that the
U.S. Navy does not deploy out from the United States; rather, it converges on
Eurasia. While perhaps a new insight, the actual practice of convergence has been
the norm since 1944; Samuel P. Huntington codified it brilliantly in his 1954 U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings article “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy.”3
However, on deeper reflection, we see that convergence is simply a physical
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/2
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manifestation of a more fundamental geopolitical reality: the United States is
simultaneously a Pacific and an Atlantic power. But even this relatively obvious
truism floats on a yet deeper reality. The fact that the United States could be split
in half and consigned to the edges of the map implies that there is nothing of geopolitical importance happening between New York and Los Angeles. This reflects
the unified political control on a continental scale that so spooked Mackinder.
Another way to put it is that the United States is a continent-sized island; but this
also is too confining a perspective. Rather, the United States is viewed best as an
“edge” power; an externality; the New World grown up and powerful, extending
its economic and ideological tentacles into Eurasia from the edges of the map.
But that is not the end of it. Because the United States must reach out across
the seas, it is inherently a maritime power. An authoritarian continental power
worries about the internal security of the regime first, but what happens on its
borders runs a close second. The United States, as a democratic maritime power,
looks at the world in a fundamentally different way. As far back as when Hamilton was writing (many of) the essays in the Federalist Papers, the following logic
was operative, at least in the mercantile New England and Mid-Atlantic states: if
what happens overseas affects what happens here (and of course it always has),
then the United States must have a voice in and influence on what happens over
there. This outlook informed Hamilton’s reasoning that a strong federal navy
operating in the Western Hemisphere could exert influence on European powers
to extract favorable economic and security policies.4 The maritime perspective
focuses on movement and communications, not borders and positions. Maritime
powers, by means of securing command of the sea, maintain sanctuary for their
economies during war, maintain credible contact with allies, and retain various
strategic maneuver options. Webs of allies, trading partners, and friends are essential elements of a successful maritime approach to grand strategy.
For all these reasons, the bisected view of the United States on a Mercator
world map produces useful insight. Whether the United States is categorized as a
global hegemon, an economic empire, or simply a global leader, this perspective
illustrates to us that a convergent engagement with Eurasia is almost a geopolitical inevitability; true isolationism never was, nor ever will be, a viable policy.
As an edge power, the United States always is looking inward on the rest of the
world, not outward from its coasts. Amplifying this effect is the national sense
of mission created by the American philosophy of governance as embodied in
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The values of liberty and
human rights are assumed to be universal, and they are protected best by means
of a democratic form of government. This is an affirmative ideology that must be
proselytized to confirm legitimacy.
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Owing to geographic and historical circumstances, the United States is the
only nation that could be an edge power. Other nations have made and will
make bids for global dominance, but none are situated so perfectly, imbued so
liberally with key resources (e.g., arable land, water, energy, minerals), and politically cohesive. While not claiming that the ascendance of the United States is an
inevitable and permanent feature of the world, the edge view indicates that the
geopolitical deck is stacked in its favor.
However, reading between the lines, as it were, we can see that American
policies and strategies matter greatly in Eurasia because the United States cannot
leave well enough alone. Influence and intervention have been the norm, not the
exception. For Eurasian continental powers, this makes the United States, in effect, a nosy and pushy great power on their borders.
COPING WITH THE CENTER: MACKINDER’S GEOPOLITICS
Life is tough in Eurasia, especially for those who wish to govern. Its history is a
sweeping panorama of invasions and counterinvasions, of empires created and
destroyed. The latest grand redrawing of national borders occurred when the
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and Russia’s recent annexation of Crimea and
fomenting of rebellion in Ukraine are still boiling. It is hard to regard frontiers as
settled matters in Eurasia; a number of active boundary disputes still exist.
The complex geography of Eurasia has spawned multiple, highly distinct
cultures that, while mutually enriching in various ways, are frequently hostile to
each other. Repeated invasions and migrations over the millennia have created
an ethnic patchwork that virtually guarantees that any geographically expansive
great power that emerges is bound to be some form of polyglot empire within its
so-called national boundaries. Most often, this results in an authoritarian regime.
Strongpoints—garrisons—must populate the national territory to prevent pieces
from breaking away.
Eurasian continental powers thus look from the center outward in terms of
national security. Security starts with the capital and radiates outward. Borders,
for a continental power, are frequently problematic. In the best case, they are
formed by mountain ranges or great rivers that represent an obstacle to invasion
or migration—in or out. When the border is an artificial line drawn across flat
terrain, it is seen, necessarily, as a potential avenue for invasion. The continental
power therefore prefers to have weak, dependent states as neighbors. Even better,
if possible, the continental power’s army garrisons these buffer states. However,
the outer frontier of a buffer state is still a frontier, and eventually the logic of
continental security requires a buffer for the buffer, and so on. There is no logical end point to buffering, perhaps best illustrated by the organic growth of the
Roman Empire; but sooner or later it is halted by collision with another power.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/2
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The continental geopolitical situation has produced two strategic rules that
the principal Eurasian powers generally have followed or tried to follow: (1) do
not engage in two-front wars, and (2) do not allow a great power to develop on
your frontiers.5 Germany violated the first rule and suffered destruction; Russia
and China have been more careful. The second rule is more problematic. Recent
scholarship has revealed that Russia had a hand in fomenting revolution in China
in 1905 and continuously supported multiple opposing parties over the years to
keep the turbulence going and
[T]he United States is viewed best as . . . the
prevent the formation of a
New World grown up and powerful, extendstrong, unified Chinese state.
ing its economic and ideological tentacles into Eventually Mao Zedong and
Eurasia from the edges of the map.
the Communists won out, and
now, after many vicissitudes
for both countries, Eurasia is populated by a strong, economically vibrant China
abutting a weakened Russia. Complicating matters, Russia faces an expanded
NATO to the west, China a rising India to its south. These geopolitical circumstances are difficult enough; but the real problem is the United States.
For the reasons previously mentioned, the United States, as an edge power
looking into Eurasia with a maritime outlook and missionary zeal, threatens both
strategic rules for a continental power. First, because its interests, and thus its
power, are forward, it constitutes a virtual great power on the continental power’s
borders. At various times, American military bases have been established in central Europe, the Middle East, the “stans,” Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. The
United States has conducted major military operations all around the Eurasian
periphery. Second, because of its command of the seas and the inherent mobility
of naval forces, and its web of alliances, economic arrangements, and friendships, the United States can pose or create a multifront challenge for any Eurasian
power. For these reasons, regardless of whether the specific interests of the United
States and a Eurasian power converge or diverge at any particular moment, the
inherent logic of the edge versus the center makes the United States a strategic
headache for the continental power. Détente and economic interdependency are
good mitigating factors, but in the final analysis, it is U.S. ideology, combined
with its economic and military power and its uniquely advantageous geopolitical situation, that makes the country corrosive to the strategic comfort level of
Eurasian continental powers.
Another way to describe the Eurasian strategic headache is to take another
look at our global Mercator chart. Again we see the United States on the edges of
the chart, but a second look reveals the United States as enclosing the Eurasian
world. As an enclosing power, the United States imposes limits on what Eurasian
powers can do. This is true because of the U.S. propensity for and success in
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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cobbling together alliances, economic rule sets, and dependencies of one sort or
another. The broad rubric to describe this array of arrangements is the export of
security. Whereas the United States sees all these arrangements as wholesome
measures meant to avert another world war and to advance human rights, a Eurasian power is bound to see pernicious meddling and impediments to the kind
of security (buffer states and neutralized nascent powers) it instinctively desires.6
For these reasons, Eurasian powers struggle against two kinds or layers of
enclosure. The first kind, geographic enclosure, consists of bordering nations,
one or more of which may be competitive, and obstructed access to the world
ocean. This latter issue is a consistent theme in strategic writings from Germany
to China. They view the world in terms of positions and strongpoints, and cannot
help but view straits and offshore islands as prison bars, regardless of who owns
them or is adjacent. Even China, with an extensive coastline, sees its maritime
flank enclosed, and therefore threatened, by the “first and second island chains.”7
Breaking jail necessarily means either politically neutralizing the ownership of
these geographic features or outright seizure.
Even if these geographic obstacles are overcome—and they never have been,
completely or permanently—there remains the suffocating web of U.S. sea power
and all the alliances and arrangements it makes possible. Here again, the United
States sees a “global system” of voluntary members whose growing economic interdependency is a natural and positive trend that enhances prosperity.8 It is the
United States that possesses bases and leased facilities around the periphery of
Eurasia; no Eurasian power has anything remotely similar near the United States,
partly because of the advantageous American geography—the coasts are clear of
islands (other than in the Caribbean) that could be used. When the Soviet Union
made a clumsy attempt to use Cuba, it precipitated a nuclear showdown. What is
out beyond the geographic prison yard of Eurasia is the network of U.S. security
relationships, ranging from formal to tacit—a strategic field of barbed wire.
Conversely, from the American perspective, the world is a wide-open, inviting
place. Only this kind of outlook would permit the adoption of a Clintonian policy
of “engagement and enlargement” in the 1990s and the adoption of an equally
expansive maritime strategy in 2007 based on defense of the global system and a
universal invitation to all navies of the world to cooperate in securing the seas.9
Strategically, life is good for the United States; it is just a matter of keeping the
inmates of the Eurasian prison calm.
THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: WORKING THE INTERSTICES
To shift metaphors, the United States is a strategic itch for Eurasian powers that
is hard to scratch. Attacking it militarily has proved suicidal. Its political system,
despite being fractious—or maybe because it is so—has produced a cohesive
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/2
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polity; it is not feasible for an outsider to break it. And the United States enjoys
relative (and increasing) resource autarky. What purchase might be found to gain
some type and degree of neutralization?
The answer might lie in the very maritime nature of the United States. A
maritime approach to grand strategy, as previously mentioned, features webs
of alliances, economic pacts, and numerous other forms of interdependencies.
If these links could be broken, the United States would be less able to act as an
edge or enclosing power. Such is an easy concept to describe, but much harder
to accomplish. Eurasian powers, from Rome to the Soviet Union, have not been
very attractive to peoples outside their cultural metropoles. With the temporary
exception of republican Rome, Eurasian powers have been and still are authoritarian states. Such a form of governance might be necessary and even accepted
by the regime’s own people, but extension of this form to others, even if their own
country is anything but democratic, is not received well.
More or less understanding this (although the Tibetans and Uighurs might
disagree), China has adopted a different approach. After Deng Xiaoping overturned Mao Zedong’s dogmatic and sequestered approach to economic development, China began its remarkable ascent. Seeking to head off any reflexive
action toward containment on the part of the United States, China adopted the
mantra of “peaceful rise” and proceeded to join, at least partway, in the process
of globalization that was in full swing after the fall of the Soviet Union.10 China
actually had some political credibility because of its loudly announced policy of
nonintervention. If China was the “Brazil” of Asia, then perhaps here was a nation with which others could deal with confidence—not like a meddling United
States that was always harping about human rights, while its Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) perhaps messed around in one’s internal affairs. When China
eventually got its economy booming, it brought real money to the table, and it
was agnostic on how one ruled one’s own country. Moreover, it knew how to do
corruption right.
Thus, China began working the interstices of the American global network.
Initially, the going was tentative and slow, with mistakes made and lessons
learned. However, as China’s wealth grew and its manufacturing expanded, it
became more dependent on foreign sources of energy and materials. Rather
than accept the risk and dependency that reliance on the global market involves,
China adopted a form of mercantilism in which it attempted to create exclusive
arrangements with foreign companies and nations.
As Chinese global initiatives gather steam, it is interesting to note a certain
pattern. While certainly not ignoring the major economic and political players,
China seems to be trying to establish various kinds of relationships with a variety
of smaller countries that are not much on the radarscope of U.S. interests. These
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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include a number of Latin American and African nations as well as countries
such as Greece, whose economy is in shambles and whose attachment to NATO
is not as strong as it once was.11 This pattern of engagement may or may not be
the result of an explicit strategy of breaking enclosure, but the net effect might be
the same regardless. To understand the potential significance of this pattern, we
must shift our focus from geopolitics to the world of business.
THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA:
HAZARDS OF BEING A FRONT-RUNNER
In 1997, Harvard Business School professor Clayton M. Christensen published a
book entitled The Innovator’s Dilemma that explained the demise of several highprofile companies. Christensen showed how embryonic technologies or business
methods, while not competitive initially with highly refined and successful ones,
through progressive improvements eventually supplanted them, and drove their
producing companies out of business. He termed these embryonic technologies
and practices “disruptive”—as indeed they turned out to be for the companies
that were their victims.
Christensen’s model of disruptive innovation involves the relative performance
of companies in a particular market, but one that is characterized by multiple
“value networks”: groups of customers that have differing needs that produce
different sets of values they place on various product criteria. Christensen cites
the computer disk drive industry of the 1990s. Mainframe producers (as customers for disk drives) placed much value on capacity and response times. Desktop
producers (and emerging technology) valued small size and cost. Companies
that focused on building drives for mainframe producers focused on improving
their relatively large drives in the realm of those criteria their customers valued.
Companies producing small disk drives did the same. However, over time, the
general improvement of small disk drives gave them the capacity to satisfy the
criteria of the mainframe customer value network, but at a lower cost. The mainframe value network thus adopted the smaller drives, but, more significantly, the
desktops improved to the point where they could displace mainframes. Thus the
mainframe value network was eliminated, and with it the producers of large disk
drives (which, for various reasons, would not enter the small-drive market).12
Using Christensen’s analysis as an analogy, we might regard the market to be
security. It would seem that all great powers must export security if they are to
achieve the key national imperatives of defense of the homeland, economic wellbeing, and a favorable world (or at least regional) order. Security comes in different flavors, and its character especially differs when seen from the continental
standpoint as opposed to the maritime perspective. Security for a continental
power consists of such things as buffer states; economic autarky, at least in the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/2
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form of a mercantilist empire; and, of course, having no great powers on the border. A maritime power sees security differently, with free markets and collective
defense being key elements. Thus a continental power exports security by building buffer states (you may be tributary to us, but we will protect you) and mercantilist arrangements (you will have a secure market if you sell exclusively to us).
Maritime powers seek to achieve collective security through the establishment of
free-market regimes (a rising economy floats all boats) and webs of alliances (all
of us against the big, bad continental powers).
Thus the United States is an exporter of security of the maritime sort. Because
of the nature of its political philosophy and its experience in World War II and
the Cold War, it exports security on the basis of (1) its massive military superiority and (2) its commitment to
Chin[ese] . . . security comes at a much lower a liberal, international, freecost than American security: no commitments market world order. Those
to refrain from subsidizing domestic industries nations that become allies
. . . , no necessity to respect human rights, and or are willing to abide by the
no pressure to democratize.
rules of the order enjoy the
security umbrella the United
States provides, under U.S. proprietorship. In the post–Cold War world, the
United States had a near monopoly on the market, a bit like IBM’s lock on the
mainframe world in the 1960s. Its value network was nearly universal.
However, in the wake of September 11th, the invasion of Iraq by the United
States started to unravel its value network. Additionally, some nations were
finding the price of system membership to be onerous. “Structural reforms” demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposed hardships such as
rising food prices on countries such as Egypt, which had a role in spawning the
Arab Spring revolution there.13 The global financial meltdown of 2008 further
damaged the value network. Add in the alienation of Russia from the West, Arab
hostility toward Israel, neo-populism in Latin America, instability in Africa,
and financial crisis along the southern European rim, and a potential customer
base is growing for an alternative type of exported security. This emerging value
network sets more value on regime security than on human rights, free-market
access, or democracy.
Enter China. Desiring to break enclosure, China seeks to establish a mercantile system of exclusive commercial rights and contracts for resources it needs
to power its economic growth. In doing so, it has a lot of money to throw at the
problem, and the strings it attaches to its purchases and investments are different from and less onerous than those attached to American-system money (IMF
loans, for example). Money of this sort represents security for regimes that are
generally more authoritarian and more socialist. The rather less rigorous quid pro
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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quo is an agreement to grant exclusive rights to China for various things, generally the right to buy the country’s resources. Also, it means allowing Chinese
workers into the country; again, in many cases, at least in the early going, this is
a nonthreatening arrangement. Finally, of course, a certain support for Chinese
interests, perhaps in the UN, would be expected.
To date, the pattern of such Chinese initiatives is such that it excites little concern by the United States. After all, countries such as Nicaragua (where Chinese
companies are proposing to dig an interocean canal), Venezuela, and Rwanda
are not of particular security interest and have governments that do not comport
with U.S. values. However, Greece, while it is capitalist and democratic and even
in NATO, is in economic crisis. It is now the recipient of attention from China—
and it may be receptive to its overtures, since Germany and the wealthier European Union (EU) countries are balking at bailing it out. This appears to represent
the expansion of a disruptive technology (Chinese-style security export) into the
American value network. What if Italy remains mired in financial crisis, and it is
China that makes an offer? The potential danger is that, if this process continues,
there will come a point at which the American value network will be displaced,
just as the mainframe computer value network was.
One of Christensen’s tenets is that large, successful companies failed precisely
because they attempted to serve their value network via product improvement. In
so doing they were unable or unwilling to offer a different product that originally
had served a different value network but improved sufficiently to serve a highend value network. The result was that the high-end value network collapsed and
the companies, if they could not adapt, went out of business. America’s product
is security, but it comes with the cost of abiding by IMF rules, respecting human
rights, and adopting democracy (generally, although there are exceptions, such
as Saudi Arabia). The benefit has been a call on the military might of the United
States when salvation is needed, such as with the Republic of Korea in 1950,
Kuwait in 1990–91, or Kosovo in 1999. China has a new, disruptive product.
Regimes in its emerging value network generally gain security (internal vice
external) by having money to buy off the opposition or to pay internal security
forces. China can provide such money, and this security comes at a much lower
cost than American security: no commitments to refrain from subsidizing domestic industries such as agriculture, no necessity to respect human rights, and
no pressure to democratize.
Christensen reports that the disruptive technology initially can satisfy only
the demands of the “low-end” value network. However, continuous incremental
improvement of the product eventually results in it being able to satisfy the demands of the high-end value network. Of course, security is not the same thing as
disk drive capacity, but still we must consider the incipient receptivity of Greece
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss2/2
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to Chinese investment initiatives in, among other things, ports and railways.14
Greece is not a third-world country; it is a member of the EU and NATO, thus—
heretofore—a member in good standing of the American security-export value
network. We may regard this as an indicator of a Christensen-like trend in the
security-export business.
THE WORLD AT CHRISTENSEN’S CRISIS POINT
Christensen’s study was precipitated by the observed failure of several leading
companies across a range of diverse industries. His narrative diagnosis of these
failures reveals that once a disruptive technology is embraced by a start-up company there follows a period during which the start-up establishes a value network
for the new technology and proceeds to improve it to the point that it starts to
meet the needs of the value network of the established high-end company. More
time elapses, during which the disruptive technology progressively takes over the
high-end value network. At a certain point, the established high-end company
finds it no longer can stay in business; this is what we will term Christensen’s
crisis point.
If this analogy is valid for modern global geopolitics—more specifically, in
the great-power security-export market—what would the world look like if the
Chinese disrupted the market for U.S.-exported security?
First, we must remind ourselves that the global system, while dependent on
U.S. military dominance, is not simply a function of it. Rather, it consists of a set
of rules, institutions, and mechanisms that regulate commerce, especially financial flows; provide for some elemental security and justice; and facilitate travel
and communication. Almost every U.S. administration avers that it desires to see
established a rules-based international order. While the U.S. military is clearly
the strongest by far in the world, and while the massive U.S. economy exerts
profound influence around the world, the global system is nevertheless not only
a voluntary club; it is dependent on the willing participation of its constituent
members, both large and small. It is, to put it in Christensen-speak, a value network that generally, since the end of the Cold War, has expressed demand for the
kind of security the United States exports.
But what if China is able to concoct a “disruptive technology,” a new style of
exported security that is parasitic on the existing global system? Providing valuefree regime security, as previously described, while taking advantage of existing
international mechanisms, China’s product spreads not only among small states
but, because of the persistent global financial crisis and structural issues, into
medium-sized or even large countries. Thus is formed a new value network that
eventually might reach such size that it commands a majority in the UN General
Assembly. At this point, perhaps, the U.S.-led global outer enclosure of Eurasia
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would come apart. We already may be seeing the start of this process in the Philippines, with recently elected President Rodrigo Duterte making a very public tilt
toward China, followed closely by Malaysia.15
Given the repeated failures of the Doha Round of global economic talks to
reach consensus on a number of trade reforms aimed at lowering barriers, not to
mention the massive and violent demonstrations that greet the major meetings,
it is not outside the scope of the plausible that structures such as the World Trade
Organization and the IMF either would be neutralized or disestablished. We
then might see the imposition of defensive economic policies around the world,
and coincidentally the establishment of hostile trade blocs. Given the uneven
distribution of resources around the globe, competition, perhaps armed, would
occur over access to them.
The United States, being
[I]f the United States persists in its approach
powerless to arrest this slide,
to exporting security, . . . it risks finding out
likely would establish its own
one day that its value network has collapsed.
economic and security bloc,
basing it on the North American Free Trade Agreement (i.e., NAFTA) and what
is left of NATO. Plausibly, we would see the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
All this would occur because the market for U.S.-style security was taken over in
large part by China, or at least the U.S. near monopoly was broken.
Having broken the external global enclosure, China could work more safely on
breaking the local enclosure. By virtue of its global client list, China could induce
Taiwan, the Philippines, and perhaps others to cut deals or cede islands, such
that China could garrison key geographic features that would turn the ringing
island chains into portals vice obstacles.16 Once this occurred, strategic enclosure
would be broken, so the strategic itch would be scratched, the strategic headache
cured. Assuming the United States finds both the money and the motivation to
maintain a strong navy, the evolution of affairs just described would usher in a
new geopolitical era, unlike any in the past. China would not displace the United
States as the global great power, as was the case when the United States displaced
Great Britain. Rather, China would become a true peer in a way the Soviet Union
never was: it would enjoy global freedom of maneuver, almost commensurate
with that of the United States.
We could use this scenario as a jumping-off point to imagine all kinds of futures, but that is not in keeping with the purpose of this article. Our speculations
to this point seem to indicate that China’s breaking of strategic enclosure would
not be immediately fatal to the United States but would tear apart the securityexport value network the United States painstakingly built over the course of the
twentieth century. It also indicates that the United States has powerful incentives to keep its existing security-export value network intact. However, to take
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a cue from Christensen, if the United States persists in its approach to exporting
security, like the high-end, successful companies that failed by following good
management practices and attending to the needs of their high-end customers, it
risks finding out one day that its value network has collapsed.
STRATEGIC OPTIONS: A DOG’S BREAKFAST
Assuming that an American administration took the view of events espoused in
this article, what strategic options might it consider? Normally, operational military planners like to concoct a list of course-of-action options that is collectively
exhaustive; that is, the aggregate list contains all possible options. Second, the list
should consist of options that are mutually exclusive; if you do one, you cannot
do the others. This goal is hard enough at the military operational level; at the
strategic level it is nearly impossible. Therefore, the options presented here are
not mutually exclusive and, while they do seem to represent the potential range of
things that could be done, there likely are an infinite number of other approaches.
Hence, these options should be regarded as illustrative rather than prescriptive.
Option 1: Stay the Course
Of course, the first option is always just to keep doing what you are doing. For
the United States, that means exporting high-end security as it has done since the
fall of the Soviet Union. The 1995 National Security Strategy clearly lays out the
characteristics of exported American security: “Our national security strategy is
based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and
containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests. The more
that democracy and political and economic liberalization take hold in the world,
particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our nation
is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.”17 In other words,
nations that democratize and adopt free-market capitalism will prosper, thereby
becoming more secure and, of course, producing a world order favorable to the
United States.
The great thing about this option is that it comports well with the American
value system. Just as we established a constitutional democracy of majority rule,
we seek (we say) a rules-based international order. This would eliminate war as a
source of insecurity and, of course, leverage the inherent advantages the United
States enjoys in terms of economic power. The problem is that the democratization wave seems to have crested. A number of countries around the world that
democratized in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse have backslid into either
authoritarianism or chaos. Populist and socialist movements have popped up in
places such as Ecuador and Belarus. The global economic meltdown aggravated
this process by dulling the burnish of democracy and reducing U.S. ability to aid
liberalization by providing resources.
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Staying the course is potentially analogous to the actions of the big companies on which Christensen reported—enterprises that failed precisely because
competent management catered to the high-end value network that demanded
the characteristics of their products. Analogously, the American high-end value
network consists of what Thomas Barnett termed the “Functioning Core,” those
nations that are integrated into the global system of commerce and security.
However, Barnett chose to include both China and Russia in that categorization,
which made some sense in 2004.18 However, Russia is one of the democratic backsliders and China never was democratic. While both are theoretically capitalist,
their versions do not comport well with the American notion of a level global
economic playing field. China can be thought of as a start-up company that has
a new, disruptive technology it is trying to market. The danger, as Christensen
points out, is that the high-end company will appear to be doing fine—until all
of a sudden the bottom drops out of the market.19
Option 2: Compete in the Alternative Value Network
Competing in the alternative value network would involve trying to beat the
Chinese at their own game. The United States metaphorically would hold its nose
and prop up nondemocratic or socialist regimes, essentially making them a better
offer than the Chinese. Of course, the United States is no stranger to this strategy,
having befriended any number of questionable governments so long as they were
anticommunist or at least anti-Soviet. The problem with this approach in this day
and age is that the Internet and pervasive media make it hard to do such things on
the q.t. Any administration that gets caught in the act will have a lot of political
damage control to do, both at home and with the members of its high-end value
network. Administrations have been getting away with befriending such authoritarian regimes as Saudi Arabia’s simply because they generally can take care of
themselves. When they cannot, as was the case with Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, a
U.S. administration is in no position to assist.
Another problem with this approach is that it costs money, especially the kind
that is hard to track, as it ends up in places not suitable for public affairs releases.
Iraq and Afghanistan are good examples of this. Huge amounts of U.S. aid ended
up in the pockets of friends and family members of Ayad Allawi, Hamid Karzai,
and other power brokers. For the Chinese, this kind of thing is no problem.
Moreover, the United States is a little short of funds right now, and it is harder to
generate funds that can be moved around “off balance sheet.”
Christensen cites companies that have adopted this strategy successfully by
creating their own internal start-up companies to sell the disruptive technology
and compete in the low-end value network. While this might work for business, it is hard to see how the United States might do such a thing, other than by
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commissioning some other nation to act in its stead. But what nation would be so
inclined, especially given the value compromises that appear necessary?
Option 3: Sabotage the Competitor
If you cannot beat your competitor at his own game, why not take him down directly? This is, of course, what we did to the Soviet Union through containment
and, some say, the Reagan military buildup. This would mean adopting some
combination of containment and economic warfare against China. However,
China is not the Soviet Union. Such a strategy might undercut our own economy,
given the interdependencies that have grown up. In addition, given the particulars of China’s increasingly assertive policies in its “near abroad,” including the
first island chain, such a policy could lead to regional conflict and war, which,
in this age, could find their way into the United States proper. Moreover, such a
strategy likely would alienate our current value network, which is also economically interdependent with China.
It is this option, or at least gradations of it, that many hawkish “dragon slayers”
find attractive. It is realism personified, and has a certain simplicity of concept
that is congenial to those who like to produce weapons, ships, aircraft, etc., and to
those who yearn for the clarity, if there was such, of the Cold War. This is perhaps
a key danger of this policy: it becomes self-referential. To justify the policy, we
define China as the enemy; China reacts in a hostile manner, thus confirming the
going-in assumption. This is otherwise known as a security dilemma.
Option 4: Disrupt the Alternative Value Network
Disruption has been an auxiliary to option 1 over the decades. The United States
covertly subverts regimes that it finds obnoxious for one reason or another.
Since the late nineteenth century there have been at least a dozen instances,
mostly during the Cold War when the United States feared that a communist or
communist-sympathetic government would advance Soviet interests. One problem with such a tactic is that it can backfire and produce a worse regime, from the
U.S. perspective. The displacement of the shah of Iran by a theocratic regime was
the unanticipated result of the CIA-engineered coup that brought him to power.
On the one hand, it would seem at least instrumentally permissible to engage in
such activities if the idea is that the replacement government will be democratic
and respectful of human rights. However, in many cases it has not panned out
that way. Moreover, a number of the countries China is courting already are at
least ostensibly democratic.
Pursuing this option would force the United States to look at itself in the
philosophical mirror. Whereas inciting regime change, whether for ideological
or realist reasons, might have been seen during the Cold War as justified in the
larger context of stemming a global communist revolution, today, in the context
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of Chinese overtures, it would take on a more baldly hegemonic cast. At the least
this would convey the impression of a double standard: internally, the United
States is all about government by the consent of the governed; externally, it is
about security above all—a stance not that different from a Eurasian continental
authoritarian power’s. The United States always has seen itself as an exemplar
of freedom and constitutional government, but pursuit of an inherently cynical,
security-based foreign policy would tarnish that image, ultimately compromising
the security it seeks to achieve.
ANALYSIS: THE PROMOTION OF VALUES IN A COMPETITIVE
WORLD
Many will recoil from the menu of options just presented, and it is called a “dog’s
breakfast” for good reason—there is nothing appetizing about it.
One way to escape from the logic is to deny the analogy, to object that the
global market for exported security cannot be likened to business dynamics.
One major factor undermining the analogy could be the desire of nations for
autonomy. Whereas nations have ceded some degree of sovereignty in the face
of a common threat—for instance, by creating NATO during the Cold War—
generally speaking, countries will hew to as independent a line as their strength
or position will allow. Thus the idea of a value network composed of nations vice
companies is a bit porous. On the other hand, we do see certain attempts, such
as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and some loose coordination among
Central and South American populist countries, to counteract the overwhelming U.S. influence. To the extent that China can knit together elements such as
these, a value network of sorts is created. Admittedly, the analogy is novel and
certainly cannot be pushed too far, but it is at least a different lens through which
to observe the world, and it would be unwise to dismiss it simply because it is
threatening to one’s values and existing worldview.
What is it that comes into focus if we peer at the world through the lens ground
by this article? Most fundamentally, we see the difficulty of attaching American
values as part of the U.S. package of exported security. This attachment seemed
most appropriate and well received in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse.
However, the emergence of a competitor that at least potentially has the wherewithal to export a different kind of security on a global basis, with a different set
of values attached, now makes our attachment of American political and moral
values too expensive a product for quite a few nations—or, better stated, regimes.
We have to look no further than the crises in Syria and Egypt to see the problem. A desire to displace autocratic rule in Syria has spawned an armed rebellion
that has attracted jihadists and helped spawn ISIS. The displacement of Mubarak
in Egypt produced a democratically elected Islamist government that rapidly
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became theologically autocratic, so in turn was displaced in a military coup, a
result that seems to reflect the will of the majority. Attaching American values to
security makes it almost impossible to render aid to either the Syrian rebels or
the Egyptian military, but this is precisely what Christensen would call for in a
business scenario: compete in the new value network.
Americans hold the values enshrined in the Declaration of Independence to
be universal; the justification for separation from Great Britain rested on that
assumption. The way we preserve those values for ourselves is through a constitutional federal republic. We thus have conflated values and structure, as was made
clear in the quote previously cited from the 1995 National Security Strategy. So,
the American-exported security package carries with it both explicit and implied
costs that may produce an existential dilemma for any number of regimes. Because many nations are polyglot—that is, they are an amalgamation of multiple
tribes or cultures—the self-identity of their citizens is cultural rather than political, so they do not cohere as naturally as the post–Civil War United States.
While the desire for freedom, security, and justice reasonably can be thought
of as universal, the mechanism by which these are achieved is bound to vary in
each case. Because of the unique geographic and historical circumstances of the
United States, Americans generally subscribe to the notion that freedom comes
first, with security and justice being possible only if freedom obtains. In countries
whose circumstances are different, this outlook is almost antithetical to their
cultural identity. Justice is valued above all, with security running a close second;
freedom is something to be desired, but must be regulated in the service of the
other two values. Conflation of values and structure prevents the United States
from perceiving and accepting this. If the United States is to compete successfully
in the alternative security value network, it will have to find a way to become
comfortable with decoupling these two elements.
In the twentieth century, the United States came to be the leviathan that
established and maintained a liberal, trading world order. The nature of the
competition—the Soviet Union—was a defective combination of malignant
ideology and military assertiveness. In this competition, the United States could
export security on the basis of conflating its values and its military might. It won
this competition; but success is a poor teacher of both limits and incisive perception. There is a new competitor and a new kind of competition in the world, and
the United States must both recognize it for what it is and adjust its securityexport strategy to account for it.
This article offers a diagnosis of the nature of the competition that is emerging. While it offers no specific formula for a new competitive grand strategy, it
is hoped that this analysis provides insight into what would be necessary for an
effective new one to be developed.
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